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It is one of the main conclusions of family economics that parental choices of fertil-
ity and education are interdependent. Parents face a tradeoff between the number
of children they have and the amount of resources they spend on the education of
each child. Since for educated women the opportunity cost of child-rearing time is
high, they will prefer to invest in the education or “quality” of a small number of chil-
dren. For less educated women, in contrast, the opportunity cost of raising children
is low, while providing education is expensive relative to their income. Mothers with
little education and low income would therefore prefer to have many children, but
invest little in the education of each child. This notion of a quantity-quality tradeoff
in the decisions on children, introduced by Becker and Lewis (1973),1 is supported
by empirical evidence on the cross-sectional distribution of fertility and education.
Table 1 shows that fertility falls with the mother’s education both in developed coun-
tries (ﬁrst row) and in developing countries (last three rows). The fertility differential
between women with high and low education is especially large in developing coun-
tries. Similarly, the education level of a child depends positively on the education of
the parents (see Fern´ andez and Rogerson 2001).
If fertility and education are joint decisions, government policies regarding education
will also have an effect on fertility behavior. In this paper, we analyze the properties
of different education systems in a framework that accounts for the joint decision
problem of parents regarding fertility and education. Speciﬁcally, we compare the
implications of a public and a private schooling regime for economic growth and the
evolution of the income distribution. Our model allows for inequality across families,
and reproduces the salient features of the income-fertility and income-education re-
lationships found in the data. Our main ﬁnding is that while private schooling leads
to higher growth when there is little inequality in human capital endowments across
families, public schooling can dominate when inequality is sufﬁciently high. This re-
sult is driven by the effects of the schooling regime on fertility differentials within the
population.
In our model economy, parents decide on their number of children and on the ed-
1Recent work on the quantity-quality tradeoff includes Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) and
Tamura (1994). These papers were the ﬁrst to demonstrate how different development regimes can
arise from endogenous fertility decisions.
1Total Fertility Rate
Survey # of Countries <Elementary Elementary Secondary+
WFS, 1975-1979 13 EUR/US 2.40 2.17 1.79
WFS, 1974-1982 30 DC 6.5 5.5 4.0
DHS, 1985-1989 26 DC 5.7 4.9 3.6
DHS, 1990-1994 27 DC 5.29 4.72 3.29
Source: Kremer and Chen (2000). WFS: World Fertility Survey. DHS: Demographic
and Health Survey. “Secondary+” is the average of low secondary, high secondary, and
post-secondary, where appropriate.
Table 1: Total Fertility Rates by Education
ucation of each child. Endogenous growth is driven by the accumulation of human
capital. With private schooling, the model generates a fertility differential between
parents with low and high human capital. Parents with low human capital have
many children and provide little education to each child. Since the parents who pro-
vide the least education have the highest fertility rates, when inequality is high, aver-
age education is low. With public schooling, the fertility differential between rich and
poor disappears. If inequality in human capital is high, this leads to higher average
education levels in the public schooling regime than in the private regime. Compar-
ing the two regimes, growth will be higher with private education when inequality is
low, while the opposite holds when inequality is high.
Another role for public education is related to the dynamics of income distribution.
Differential fertility introduces a centrifugal force in the economy: higher reproduc-
tion rates by low-skilled people increase the relative number of the poor and can
reduce their relative income. Because public education eliminates the fertility differ-
ential between skilled and unskilled, it offsets this centrifugal force.
Our results underline the importance of accounting for the joint fertility-education
decision when analyzing educational policies. The existing literature on the respec-
tive merits of public and private education has mostly relied on models with exoge-
nous fertility. Itisinstructive to compare ourresults to Glomm and Ravikumar(1992),
who analyze the choice of an education regime in an endogenous growth model with
ﬁxed fertility. Glomm and Ravikumar ﬁnd, as we do, that public schooling can lead
2to higher growth only if initial inequality is high, but they arrive at this conclusion for
different reasons. In their model, the friction favoring private schooling is a ﬁscal ex-
ternality, which is not present in our model. Public schooling can dominate in terms
of growth if the income distribution is sufﬁciently unequal, and the production func-
tion for human capital is sufﬁciently concave. Concavity also makes public schooling
more attractive in our model, but a second key factor in favor of public schooling is
the endogenous fertility differential.
Our results are also related to a literature that considers the effect of local ﬁnancing
of public schools, which is the predominant model in the United States. Our analysis
implicitly assumes that the public schooling regime is national, i.e., all students in
the public regime receive the same amount of education. If public schooling is lo-
cally ﬁnanced, spending per child becomes a function of average income in a given
school district. B´ enabou (1996a) and Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1998) ﬁnd that local
ﬁnancing can lead to stratiﬁcation in income levels across localities, which ultimately
results in educational segregation despite apublicschooling system. B´ enabou(1996b)
and Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1996, 1997) show how state and local regulations af-
fect education ﬁnance and inequality in this environment. Tamura (2001) points out
that whether convergence occurs across school districts with different income levels
depends on the relative importance of teacher quality versus class size for human
capital accumulation. Tamura argues that convergence will occur if teacher quality
matters more, and he ﬁnds empirical support for the importance of teacher quality
in U.S. data. The literature on local school ﬁnancing generally does not take account
of the joint determination of fertility and education decisions. Our analysis could be
extended to a model with local school districts, in which case migration and external-
ities across localities would be key determinants of convergence and growth.
The long-run impact of existing fertility differentials on educational outcomes and
the income distribution has been studied by Mare (1997) and Fern´ andez and Roger-
son (2001). Mare (1997) ﬁnds that fertility differentials per se are too small in the U.S.
to have large effects on average education.2 Fern´ andez and Rogerson (2001), on the
other hand, show that the association of fertility differentials with the degree of mar-
ital sorting can lead to sizable long-run effects. While the last two papers take poli-
2This is consistent with our theory, since the U.S. has a strong public education system, and fertility
differentialsarethereforeexpectedto be small. Fertility differentialsarelargerin developing countries,
and are correlated with inequality; see Table 1 and Kremer and Chen (2000).
3cies as given, Knowles (1999b) demonstrates that accounting for endogenous fertility
differentials is important for understanding the long-run consequences of redistribu-
tional policies. Speciﬁcally, direct income transfers tend to increase fertility differen-
tials, and can thereby have perverse long-run effects on the income distribution. The
theoretical framework used here derives from de la Croix and Doepke (2002), who
examine the importance of fertility differentials for explaining the empirical relation-
ship between inequality and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with private and
public education and derives optimal fertility and education choices. In Sections 3
and 4, we compare the dynamic properties of the economy under the two education
regimes, andcontrast the implications of private and publiceducation for growth and
inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup with Private Education
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for
two periods, childhood, and adulthood. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to ∞.A l l
decisions are made in the adult period of life. People are indexed by i and differ
only in their human capital endowment hi
t. Adults care about consumption ci
t,t h e i r
number of children ni
t, and the human capital of children hi






The parameter γ > 0 is the altruism factor. Notice that parents care about both child
quantity ni
t and quality hi
t+1. As we will see below, the tradeoff between quantity and
quality is affected by the human capital endowment of the parent.
Raising one child takes fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time. An adult has to choose
consumption ci
t, the number of children ni
t, and education per child et. Education
is provided by teachers, and we assume that the average human capital of teachers
equals the average human capital in the population ¯ ht. Education ei
t is measured in
units of time of the average teacher, so that the total education cost for ni
t children
4is given by ni
tei






t¯ ht = hi
t(1 − φni
t).( 1 )
Here the price of the consumption good and the wage per unit of human capital are
normalized to one because production is linear in human capital. The assumption
that teachers instead of parents provide education is crucial for generating fertility
differentials. It implies that the cost of education per child is independent of the par-
ent’s wage. In contrast, since raising each child takes a ﬁxed amount of the parent’s
time, having many children is more costly for parents who have high wages. Parents
with high human capital and high wages therefore substitute child quality for child
quantity, and decide to have fewer children with more education.3
The human capital of the children hi
t+1 depends on human capital of the parents hi
t,
average or teacher’s human capital ¯ ht,a n de d u c a t i o nei
t:
hi
t+1 = µ(θ + ei
t)η(hi
t)τ(¯ ht)1−τ.( 2 )
The parameters satisfy µ,θ > 0a n dη,τ ∈ (0,1). The presence of θ guarantees that
human capital remains positive even if parents do not invest in education. This ac-
cumulation technology assumes diminishing returns to parental human capital, but
constant returns to scale in parental human capital and teacher human capital. This
assumption iscommon in theliterature (see, e.g., Tamura 1991; dela CroixandMichel
2002)where the spillover effect of average human capital is found to be crucial for hu-
man capital convergence.
We assume that the population is divided into two groups A and B with human
capital hA
t and hB
t ,w h e r eA is the group with less human capital: hA
t < hB
t .T h e
absolute sizes of the groups are given by PA
t and PB













3To generate fertility differentials we only need to assume that the education cost is independent
of the parent’s wage. The more speciﬁc assumption that the teachers have the same average human
capital as the general population is made to allow for balanced growth.
5In this formulation we abstract from inter-group mobility and in particular from mo-
bility through mating. The extent to which mating can reduce the “inheritability” of
skills is limited by the fact that mating is assortative on average.4 Average human











The aggregate production function for the consumption good is linear in the aggre-
gate supply of effective labor:
Yt = Lt,





t (1 − φnA








t (1 − φnB





Notice that the education time for all children is subtracted from total labor supply,
since time devoted to teaching is not available for goods production. Since the to-
tal efﬁciency units of labor needed for education are ﬁxed, it does not matter who
provides the education in equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume without loss of
generality that there is an identical share of teachers in both groups. We assume that
production is carried out by a competitive ﬁrm, which implies that the wage per unit
of human capital is one. Instead of writing out this condition explicitly, we already
incorporated it in the budget constraint.
Deﬁnition 1 (Private-Education Equilibrium) Given initial human capital endowments
(hA
0 ,hB
0) and group sizes (PA
0 , PB
0 ), an equilibrium with private education consists of se-
quences of aggregate quantities {ξt, ¯ ht, Lt},g r o u ps i z e s{Pi










t+1 maximize utility subject to the constraints
(1) and (2);
2. the group populations evolve according to (3);
4See Kremer (1997) and Fern´ andez and Rogerson (2001) on the effects of sorting and assortative
mating on long-run inequality; Gokhale, Kotlikoff, Sefton, and Weale (2001)on the interaction between
mating processes, the inheritability of skills, and the inter-generational transmission of inequality; and
Preston and Campbell (1993) on differential fertility and the distribution of IQ.
63. aggregate variables ξt, ¯ ht,a n dL t are given by (4), (5), and (6).
2.2 Fertility and Education Choices Under Private Education







The solution to the household decision problem can either be interior, or at a corner
where the household chooses zero education. For a household that has enough hu-
man capital such that the condition xi
t > θ
φη holds, there is an interior solution for the












t − θ)(1 + γ)
.( 8 )
The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed. Note that education in-
creases in human capital xi, while fertility decreases in xi. This reﬂects the fact that
skilled people investrelatively more in the quality oftheirchildren than intheir quan-
tity (see Table 1 and the discussion in the introduction). The lowest possible fertility









For a household endowed with a human capital such that xi
t ≤ θ
φη holds, the optimal
choice for education ei
t is zero. The ﬁrst-order conditions imply:
ei






Once the choice for education is zero, fertility in equation (10) no longer increases
as the human capital endowment falls. To ensure that at least households of type B
invest in education, i.e. eB > 0 ∀ xB > 1, we impose an upper bound on θ in the
7following assumption:
Assumption 1
The parameters satisfy the following condition:
ηφ > θ.
When Assumption 1 does not hold, the amount of human capital one receives even
without investing in education is so high that a parent with average human capital
(x = 1) would chose zero education.
Fertility as a function of relative human capital is plotted in Figure 1. The horizontal
part of the relationship corresponds to the range of human capital which leads to a
choice of zero for education et. Fertility depends negatively on human capital, and








The fertility differential between people with low and high human capital tends to
lower the growth rate of the economy, since the parents who do not invest in educa-
tion have the highest number children. As we will see later, this differential-fertility
effect has implications for the advantages of public and private education.
2.3 The Setup with Public Education
In the public education regime, parents do not choose an individual education level
for their children. Instead, the government levies a proportional income tax vt on all
adults, and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance a common education level ¯ et for all children.



















Figure 1: Fertility as a Function of Human Capital
Notice that parents are not allowed to provide private education in addition to the




t+1 = µ(θ + ¯ et)η(hi
t)τ(¯ ht)1−τ. (12)
Since the government has to observe budget balance, total expenditure on education








t (1 − φnA
t )+PB
t hB
t (1 − φnB
t )). (13)
Weassume that vt and therefore ¯ et aredeterminedineachperiod byavote oftheadult
population. Since we assume logarithmic utility, it will turn out that all adults prefer
the same tax rate. Therefore no conﬂict of interest arises, and the tax is independent
of the distribution of human capital.
Deﬁnition 2 (Public-Education Equilibrium) Given initial human capital endowments
(hA
0 ,hB
0) and group sizes (PA
0 , PB
0 ), an equilibrium with public education consists of se-
quences of aggregate quantities {ξt, ¯ ht, Lt },g r o u ps i z e s{Pi
t+1}i=A,B, private decision rules
5We concentrate on the polar case where all education is provided by the government. Results
for mixed regimes where parents can top off the public education would lie in between the polar cases
considered here. In particular,the threshold for inequality above which a mixed regime leadsto higher




t+1}i=A,B, and policy variables {vt, ¯ et},s u c ht h a t :
1. the households’ decision rules ci
t,n i
t,h i
t+1 maximize utility subject to the constraints
(11) and (12);
2. the government’s budget constraint (13) is satisﬁed;
3. given decision rules, the policy variables maximize the utility of adult households;
4. the group populations evolve according to (3);
5. aggregate variables ξt, ¯ ht,a n dL t are given by (4), (5), and (6).
2.4 Fertility and Policy Choices Under Public Education
Once the education level is ﬁxed by public policy, parents no longer face a quality-
quantity tradeoff. Therefore the optimal fertility choice is independent of parental
human capital. The ﬁrst-order condition for nt implies that everyone chooses the



































µ(θ + φvt/γ)η(ht)τ(¯ ht)1−τ
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The second-order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed. Assumption 1 guarantees a
positive level of public education.
3 Comparing Private and Public Education
3.1 Long-Run Dynamics
To study the dynamic behavior of the economy, it is useful to introduce the growth





Along the balanced growth path, gt is also the growth rate of GDP per capita.
We ﬁrst consider the private education regime. There cannot be a balanced growth
pathwith group Ainthe cornerregime(noeducation, high fertility), because itwould
imply that the relative size of this group would go to 1. Since we are mainly interested
in the dynamics around the balanced growth path, we therefore consider cases where
the maximization program of all individuals yields interior solutions. Replacing the
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φxi
t − θ





Using the deﬁnitions of relative human capital xi
t = hi
t/¯ ht and the population ratio
ξt = PB
t /PA












t+1 using equation (17), we obtain an expression for the growth

























The law of motion for the population ratio ξt is obtained by replacing the optimal









Finally, from the deﬁnition of average human capital (5) we have:
xB
t = 1 + ξt(1 − xA
t ). (20)
The set of equations (17) to (20) can be restated as a dynamic system of order two in
the variables (xA
t ,ξt). An analysis of this system leads to the following proposition
(proven in the appendix):
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there is a balanced growth path of the economy with
private education characterized by xA
t = xB
t = 1, i.e., inequality has vanished. The growth
rate of output and human capital is:






This balanced growth path is locally stable if:




Along this balanced growth path, there is no longer any inequality among house-
holds. This is the case because we have assumed that the only difference across
households lies in their initial level of human capital. If we had introduced ability
shocks on top of an unequal initial distribution of human capital, inequality would
persist along the balanced growth path. However, this inequality would simply re-
ﬂect the randomness of abilities, and would not change our main conclusions.
12The stability condition imposes an upper limit on the parameter τ.I fτ exceeds this
limit, the aggregate externality deriving from ¯ ht in equation (2) is not strong enough
to offset the effect of parental human capital hi
t, and inequality will persist or increase
over time.
We now turn to the case of public education. Since parents with high and low human
capital have the same number of children, the relative size of the groups is constant
over time:
ξt+1 = ξt = ξ0.
To analyze the dynamics of the economy, we replace the public education level (16)














Combining this with (20) gives:
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τ < 1. Along the balanced growth path, the growth rate can be computed by setting
xA = 1 in equation (21). The analysis leads to the following proposition (proven in
the appendix):
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, there is a balanced growth path of the economy with
public education characterized by xA
t = xB
t = 1, i.e., inequality has vanished. The growth







This balanced growth path is globally stable.
13In summary, both under private and public education there exists a balanced growth
path in which all inequality has vanished. The stability properties of the two edu-
cation regimes, however, are different. Under public education, all children receive
the same education. Since we assume that the children’s human capital increases
less than proportionally with the parent’s human capital (τ < 1 ) ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
inequality decreases over time. From any initial conditions, the economy with public
education converges to a balanced growth path in which inequality had disappeared.
In the private regime, education choices differ across the two groups. Children whose
parents have an above-average human capital endowment receive above-average ed-
ucation. If the effect of parental human capital on their children’s human capital is
sufﬁciently large, the combined effect of parental endowments and education can
lead to rising inequality. In that case, the economy does not converge to the balanced
growth path, and the income difference between the two groups can grow without
bounds.
Note that, in our framework, the only public education regime is a national education
regime. It approximates countries where the central government organizes educa-
tion, like the majority of developing countries, and much of Europe. If one considers
the possibility that school districts may not be national in scale, convergence can still
predominate, either because the difference in education of teachers across school dis-
tricts is smaller than the differences in education of parents (Tamura 2001), or because
there are knowledge spillovers across districts (de la Croix and Monfort 2000), or be-
cause stratiﬁcation is slowed down by higher housing rents in rich districts (B´ enabou
1996c). If convergence still prevails, it will be at a slower pace than with a national
education system, because resources put into the regional public education system
will rely more heavily on the district income level, and redistribution across regions
through taxes will be lower.
3.2 Implications for Growth
On a balanced growth path, both regimes display constant fertility and education,
and the choice for education is lower in the public education regime. From (7), in the










which is clearly lower. The choice of fertility, on the other hand, is higher with public




(φ − θ)(1 + γ), (23)





Given that Assumption 1 holds, (24) always exceeds (23). The growth rate along the
balanced growth path depends directly on education. Therefore, once the balanced
growth path is reached, growth is always higher in the private regime. The following
proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, along a balanced growth path, education and growth
are lower under public education than under private education, while fertility is higher.
The reason for the growth rate differential is that in the public regime, parents do not
internalize the negative effect of havingmany children on the education resources per
child. Therefore they choose a relatively higher number of children, and education
spending per child is smaller than in the private regime.
Even if the economy is not on the balanced growth path, fertility and education are
ﬁxed in the public education regime. In the private education regime, however, both
choice variables depend on the parent’s human capital. Adults with low human cap-
ital invest less in education and have a higher number of children. Both effects tend
15to lower the growth rate of human capital. This opens the possibility for the public
regime to yield higher growth.
Using the production function for human capital (2) and equation (3), the growth rate








































This expression holds for both private and public education, and shows that the
growth rate depends on the education choices of groups A and B,a n dt h er e l a t i v e
weight of their children in tomorrow’s population.
Allowing for endogenous fertility has two distinct effects on the growth rate of hu-
man capital. First, the additional margin of family size increases the difference in the
education choice ei
t between the two groups, since poor households substitute out of
education and into the quantity of children. If we imposed a constant number of chil-
dren on all households, the group with more human capital would still choose more
education, but for given human capital levels xA
t and xB
t t h ed i f f e r e n c ei ne d u c a t i o n
eB
t − eA
t would be smaller than with endogenous fertility. Second, under private ed-
ucation endogenous fertility introduces a fertility differential between poor and rich
parents. Therefore in (25) additional weight is placed on the group with higher fer-
tility. Since under private education fertility is higher for parents with little human
capital, the fertility differential hampers growth of human capital.

















16Since group B is deﬁned as the one with higher human capital, we have xB
t ≥ 1, and
therefore their education is always higheri nt h ep r i v a t et h a ni nt h ep u b l i cr e g i m e .
For group A, the private regime yields higher education only if xA
t is close to one.
Comparing the two expressions, we ﬁnd that education will be higher in the private
regime if xA
t is large enough to satisfy the following condition:
xA
t ≥
φ(1 − η)+θ(1 + γ)
φ(1 + γη)
. (26)
If condition (26) is met, the private regime must lead to higher growth than the pub-
lic regime, since education is higher for both types of parents. If xA
t is sufﬁciently
low such that (26) is violated, which regime results in higher growth depends on the
relative population weight of the two groups.
Proposition 4 Assume that Assumption 1 holds, and that the parameters satisfy η +τ < 1.
Then for a given xA
t sufﬁciently low to violate (26), there exists a threshold for ξt above which
the public education regime yields higher growth than the private education regime.
Proof: Fix an xA
t violating (26). Assume that the relative size ξt of group A goes to
inﬁnity while holding xA
t constant, and notice that xB
t depends on xA
t and ξt and is
given by (20):
xB
t = 1 + ξt(1 − xA
t ),
while eB









































t is bounded and we assume η +τ < 1, the second term inside the parentheses












17Thus in the limit only the education choices of group A will matter for growth. Since
we assume that (26) is violated, group A chooses higher education under public than
under private education. Therefore, there is some ξt sufﬁciently high such that the
growth rateof averagehumancapitalishigherinthepublic regimethanintheprivate
regime. 
In summary, when the economy is not on the balanced growth path, growth can
be higher either in the public or in the private regime. If there is little inequality
(xA
t i sc l o s et oo n e )o ri fg r o u pB makes up a large fraction of the population, the
private regime will yield higher growth. If xA
t is sufﬁciently low to violate (26), and
if the relative size ξt of group A is sufﬁciently large, the public regime will lead to
higher growth. Thus, the question which regime leads to higher growth hinges on
the initial distribution of income and population. Moreover, as the economy evolves
over time, the relative income and size of the two groups changes, which can revert
the advantages of the two regimes. This possibility is explored in more detail in the
next section.
4 Growth and Inequality over Time
In this section we analyze the effects of private and public educati o no nt h ee v o l u t i o n
of growth and inequality. In particular, we want to demonstrate that the ranking of
the two regimes in terms of economic growth can switch as the income distribution
changes over time. For this purpose we compute outcome paths for a parameter-
ized version of our economy under private and public education. The key parameter
governing dynamics in the model is the elasticity τ of children’s human capital with
respect to their parents’ human capital, and we compute outcomes for a range of
values for τ. The remaining parameters have been calibrated to match the balanced
growth path of the private-education model to U.S. data.
4.1 Calibration
The overall productivity µ does not affect decisions and growth rate differentials and
can therefore be chosen arbitrarily; we set it such that the balanced growth rate is 2%
18per year. The altruism parameter γ is chosen such that the growth rate of population
in the balanced growth path is zero. This leads to γ = 0.169. The elasticity η of hu-
man capital with respect to education governs the maximum fertility differential. To
prevent inﬂating the role of fertility differentials, it is important not to choose η too
high. A conservative estimate is η = 0.6, which leads to a maximum fertility ratio of
2.5 (i.e., if minimum fertility is two children per woman, the maximum is ﬁve). This
is well below the maximum differentials observed within countries. The time-cost
parameter φ for having a child determines the overall opportunity cost of children.
Evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999a) suggests that the op-
portunity cost of a child is equivalent to about 15% of the parents’ time endowment.
This cost only accrues as long as the child is living with the parents. If we assume
that children live with parents for 15 years and that the adult period lasts 30 years,
the overall time cost should be 50% of the time cost per year with the child present.
Accordingly, we choose φ = 0.075. The parameter θ in the production function for
human capital affects the education choice of parents, and therefore determines the
aggregate expenditures on education. We choose θ such that in the balanced growth
path of the private education regime, total education expenditure as a fraction of GDP
matches the corresponding value in U.S. data, which is about 7.5% (see U.S. Depart-
ment of Education 1998). The implied choice is θ = 0.017. The remaining parameter
τ determines the weight of parental human capital in the production of children’s
human capital. In other words, τ captures the intergenerational transmission of abil-
ity, as well as human capital formation within the family that does not work through
formal schooling. Empirical studies ﬁnd such effects to be relatively small. Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin (1994) estimate that an additional year of the mother’s education
at the high school level (roughly a 10 percent increase in education) raises a child’s
test scores by 2.4 percent. Arleen Leibowitz (1974) ﬁnds that even after controlling
for schooling and education of the parents, parental income has a signiﬁcant effect on
a child’s earnings. A 10 percent increase in parental income increases a child’s future
earnings by up to 0.85 percent. Since τ has a large effect on the dynamic properties
of the model, we leave it unspeciﬁed for now and compute outcomes for a range of
different choices for τ. The threshold for τ below which the private education bal-
anced growth path is stable is 1 −
ηφ
φ−θ = 0.224. The empirical studies suggest that
the stable region of the parameter space is the empirically relevant case. Given our
parameter choices, the human capital threshold below which people do not educate
19τ = 0
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Figure 2: Initial Conditions for which Growth is Higher with Public Education
their children is θ/(ηφ)=0.38.
4.2 Initial Conditions and Growth
We found in the last section that private education will always lead to higher growth
if inequality is low, but public education can dominate if inequality is high. Figure 2
shows the range of initial conditions ξ0 and xA
0 for which public education leads to
higher growth in the parameterized economy, for four different values of τ.I n a l l
cases, private education dominates for xA
0 that exceed a value of about 0.6. Below this
value, there is a zone in which public schooling dominates, and the size of this zone
20is decreasing in τ. The range of xA
0 for which public education yields more growth
increases in ξ0, i.e., public education is more likely to be advantageous when group
A is relatively large.
Interestingly, when the relative human capital xA
0 becomes very low, private school-
ing dominates once again. The reason is that there is a lower limit for the education
of group A (at zero), and an upper limit for fertility. Once xA
0 is low enough to reach
the corner solution for education and fertility, the only effect of decreasing xA
0 further
is to increase xB
0 and therefore the education of group B, which raises growth. This
same effect does not arise in the public education regime, since fertility and education
are independent of xA
0 and xB
0.
The inﬂuence of τ on the regions is related to the allocation of total education spend-
ing on groups A and B. Notice that fertility and education decisions are independent
of τ. Therefore the only effect of changing τ on growth is the direct one—through
the weight of parental human capital in the production function for hi
t+1.W h e n τ
is zero, parental human capital has no direct effect on the children’s human capital.
For a given amount of total spending, growth is maximized if equal amounts are
s p e n to nc h i l d r e no ft y p e - A and type-B parents. Since spending is equalized under
public schooling, the region of higher growth under public schooling is large when
τ is small. When τ is large, the return on education is higher for type-B children,
since they beneﬁt more from parental human capital. Education for type-B children
is higher under private schooling; thus private education yields higher growth.
4.3 Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality Dynamics
Figures 3 and 4 show how human capital and inequality evolve over time under
public and private schooling.6 The only difference between the two ﬁgures concerns
the value of the parameter τ. The balanced growth path with private education is
stable in Figure 3 with τ = 0.22, while it is unstable in Figure 4 with τ = 0.5. In both
case, the other parameters are set as described in Section 4.1, and the initial condition
is ξ0 = 90 and xA
0 = 0.38. At this initial condition, group A chooses zero education in
the private regime.
6In our economy human capital is a better measure of wealth than GDP per capita, as the number
of children enters utility, but time spent raising children does not enter GDP.
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Figure 3: Dynamics with Public (Solid Line) and Private Education (Dashes): τ = 0.22
We ﬁrst consider Figure 3 (τ = 0.22), so that the dynamics are stable. Average human
capital, the Ginicoefﬁcientforthedistribution ofhumancapital, andhumancapitalof
the poorest group are plotted for the ﬁrst ﬁve periods.7 In the initial period, growth
of average human capital is higher with public schooling, as it has to be given our
choice of initial conditions. Inequality falls under both public and private education.
In the private regime, the children of group-B parents receive more education, but
since τ is low, parental human capital has little effect and inequality still declines. In
the second period, the growth advantage shifts to the private regime, since xA has
increased, and the education and fertility differential is reduced. From the second
period on, as xA approaches one, average human capital per capita keeps increasing
in both regimes, but growth is higher with private education. Inequality is further
reduced in each case, with the faster reduction occurring under public education.
If the objective were to maximize growth, the optimal policy would be to start out
with public education, and switch to private education later on. An unambiguous
welfare ranking of the policies is not possible, since at least initially the two groups
have opposing interests, and there is no obvious method of accounting for popula-
tion changes when evaluating welfare. However, given that inequality is reduced
faster under public education, it is apparent that if policies were chosen according
to a welfare function which places most weight on group A, public education could
be maintained longer than in the growth-maximizing policy. This is reﬂected in the
third panel of the Figure where the human capital of the poorest group beneﬁts from
7T h eG i n ii n d e xc a nb ec o m p u t e da sξt(1 − xA
t )/(1 + ξt).
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Figure 4: Dynamics with Public (Solid Line) and Private Education (Dashes): τ = 0.5
public education until t = 3, i.e. one more period than average human capital.
The graphs in Figure 4 show average human capital, inequality, and human capital
of group A for τ = 0.5, a value well above the stability limit. For this value of τ,
private schooling always gives higher growth than public schooling. Consequently,
average human capital is higher under private schooling from the ﬁrst period on.
However, the higher growth rate comes at the price of increased inequality. Under
public schooling, inequality decreases over time, and the economy converges to the
balanced growth path without inequality. Under private schooling, xA
t converges to
zero and the Gini coefﬁcient converges to one. At the same time, fertility is perma-
nently higher for group A, implying that in the limit group A makes up 100 percent of
the population, while accounting for zero percent of the income. Thus even though
private schooling maximizes growth unambiguously, the tradeoff between growth
and inequality is even more stark than before. Given that private schooling implies
that an ever decreasing share of the population earns an ever increasing share of in-
come, private schooling would not be chosen (at least not permanently) given any
welfarefunction thatplacessome weightongroup A. Indeed,humancapital ofgroup
A is higher with public education at least during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to examine the merits of private and public schooling
within a framework that takes explicit account of the interdependence of education
23and fertility decisions. The analysis leads to three main conclusions. First, we ﬁnd
that public schooling can distort the fertility and education choice of parents, in the
sense that parents increase fertility once education is provided for free. In doing so,
parents do not internalize the negative effect of having many children on the educa-
tion resources per child. This effect explains that in a balanced growth path in which
t h e r ei sn oi n e q u a l i t y ,t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fi n c o m ep e rc a p i t ai sh i g h e rw i t hp r i v a t e
education.
Second, when there is inequality, we ﬁnd that the comparison of growth rates can
switch in favor of public education. The reason is that under private education, par-
ents with below-average income substitute child quantity for quality, and therefore
have many children and invest little in education per child. This substitution has a
double-negative effect on growth: Children of poor parents have little human capital,
and since poor parents have many children, a lot of weight is placed on children with
little human capital when computing the average. This differential-fertility effect is
not present under public education, since education is free and all parents have the
same number of children.
Third, the same differential-fertility effect which lowers growth under private educa-
t i o nc a na l s or e s u l ti nad i v e r g i n gi n c o m ed istribution. Since poor parents have more
children than the average, groups with below-average income make up an increasing
share of the population over time. If intergenerational persistence in human capital
is high, the income of low-skilled groups declines relative to the average. The result
is that an ever decreasing fraction of the population accounts for an ever increasing
fraction of total income. This divergence can be prevented by a public education sys-
tem, since fertility and education are equalized across income groups, so that relative
group sizes stay the same and incomes converge.
In deriving these results, we use a framework which deliberately downplays the role
of fertility differentials, since we assume that skilled and unskilled labor are perfect
substitutes in the production function (i.e., production is linear in effective labor sup-
ply). If different skills were more complementary (as in a Cobb-Douglas production
function using skilled and unskilled labor), changes in the relative number of skilled
and unskilled people would have large effects on relative wages. In such a model
fertility differentials would have even larger effects on the evolution of the income
distribution. Moreover, in concentrating on the role of joint fertility and education
24decisions, our model abstracts from other features which affect the choice of an ed-
ucation regime. For example, a part of the literature argues in favor of education
subsidies because of aggregate human capital externalities. If there were an external-
ity from total (as opposed to average) human capital in our model, increased fertility
would increase the growth rate. In such a model, public education could lead to
higher growth even when there is no inequality.
A robust implication of our analysis is that the merits of different educational systems
depend on the initial distribution of income and population. While in this paper we
take policies as given, the results indicate that an optimizing policy maker might be
expected to switch from one education regime to another as the income distribution
evolves over time. The question arises whether the actual history of educational poli-
cies in different countries can be explained by a model of political decision making
which takes the effects explored in this paper into account. We plan to explore this
possibility in further research.
25A Local Stability with Private Education
Proof of Proposition 1 The set of equations (17) to (20) can be restated as a dynamic
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The only ﬁxed point of this system is (ξ,1). Linearizing around this points leads to:
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The linearized dynamics of xA
t are autonomous and xA
t converges to 1 if
θτ−(η+τ)φ
θ−φ <
1, that is τ < 1 −
ηφ
φ−θ. 
B Global Stability with Public Education











 τ ≡ Φ(xA
t ).
We study the dynamics xA
t+1 = Φ(xA
t ) in the interval [0,1]. There are two ﬁxed ﬁxed
















 1−τ  
1 + ξ0(1 − xA
t )
 τ 2 > 0,
xA
t thus converges either to 0 or to 1. The local stability of these two points depends
on the derivative of Φ:
Φ (0+) = +∞Φ  (1)=τ.
Since the ﬁxed point at 0 is locally unstable and the dynamics are monotone, the ﬁxed
point at 1 is globally stable. 
26References
Becker, Gary S. and H. Gregg Lewis. 1973. “On the Interaction between the Quantity
and Quality of Children.” Journal of Political Economy 81:S279–288.
Becker, Gary S., Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert Tamura. 1990. “Human Capital,
Fertility, and Economic Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 98:12–37.
B´ enabou, Roland. 1996a. “Equity and Efﬁciency in Human Capital Investment: The
Local Connection.” Review of Economic Studies 63 (2): 237–64.
. 1996b. “Heterogeneity, Stratiﬁcation, and Growth: Macroeconomic Impli-
cations of Community Structure and School Finance.” American Economic Review
86 (3): 584–609.
. 1996c. “Inequality and Growth.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 11–74.
de la Croix, David and Matthias Doepke. 2002. “Inequality and Growth: Why
Differential Fertility Matters.” Forthcoming, American Economic Review.
de la Croix, David and Philippe Michel. 2002. ATheoryof EconomicGrowth: Dynamics
and Policy in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de la Croix, David and Philippe Monfort. 2000. “Education funding and regional
convergence.” Journal of Population Economics 13 (3): 403–424.
Fern´ andez, Raquel and Richard Rogerson. 1996. “Income Distribution, Communi-
ties, and the Quality of Public Education.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1):
135–64.
. 1997. “Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning, and the Quality
of Public Education.” International Economic Review 38 (1): 23–42.
. 1998. “Public Education and Income Distribution: A Dynamic Quantitative
Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform.” American Economic Review 88 (4): 813–
833.
. 2001. “Sorting and Long-Run Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116
(4): 1305–41.
Glomm, Gerhard and B. Ravikumar. 1992. “Public Versus Private Investment in
Human Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality.” Journal of Political
Economy 100 (4): 818–834.
Gokhale, Jagadeesh, Lawrence Kotlikoff, James Sefton, and Martin Weale. 2001.
“Simulatingthe Transmission ofWealthInequalityvia Bequests.” Journal ofPublic
Economics 79:93–128.
Haveman, Robert and Barbara Wolfe. 1995. “The Determinants of Children’s At-
tainments: A Review of Methods and Findings.” Journal of Economic Literature 33
(4): 1829–78.
27Knowles, John. 1999a. “Can Parental Decisions Explain U.S. Income Inequality?”
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
. 1999b. “Social Policy, Equilibrium, Poverty and Investment in Children.”
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Kremer, Michael. 1997. “How Much Does Sorting Increase Inequality?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112 (1): 115–39.
Kremer, Michael and Daniel Chen. 2000. “Income Distribution Dynamics with En-
dogenous Fertility.” NBER Working Paper No. 7530.
Leibowitz, Arleen. 1974. “Home Investments in Children.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 82 (2): S111–S131.
Mare, Robert D. 1997. “Differential Fertility, Intergenerational Educational Mobility,
and Racial Inequality.” Social Science Research 26:263–291.
Preston, Samuel H. and Cameron Campbell. 1993. “Differential Fertility and the
Distribution of Traits: The Case of IQ.” American Journal of Sociology 98 (5): 997–
1019.
Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 1994. “Are There Increasing Returns
to the Intergenerational Production of Human Capital? Maternal Schooling and
Child Intellectual Achievement.” Journal of Human Resources 29 (2): 670–93.
Tamura, Robert. 1991. “Income Convergence in an Endogenous Growth Model.”
Journal of Political Economy 99 (3): 522–40.
. 1994. “Fertility, Human Capital, and the Wealth of Families.” Economic
Theory 4 (4): 593–603.
. 2001. “Teachers, Growth and Convergence.” Journal of Political Economy 109
(5): 1021–1059.
U.S. Department of Education. 1998. Digest of Education Statistics. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Education.
28